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Microsoft has disabled this DLL registration and repair tool unless you buy an MSDN subscription. Retail users can't get DLL to register, and they are offering $200 in Azure crap for paying a monthly fee! Microsoft fails to register DLL. In the old days you used to right click on a DLL and hit "install" which worked. Back in windows 98, 2000, even Vista, you could register DLL. Now it requires a subscription to use software. This paywall hidden behind a broken installer is simply unacceptable, and I hope that Azure+M$ Office get replaced.
Dll tool 1.0 crack
we have an issue with Sophos Flashing Tool. We tried to unbrick an AP15 using the tool from here: -us/135236 but everytime when we run it and press on "Connect" it immediately closes and we have the following 2 events in logs:
The sample contained a malicious payload associated with Brute Ratel C4 (BRc4), the newest red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool to hit the market. While this capability has managed to stay out of the spotlight and remains less commonly known than its Cobalt Strike brethren, it is no less sophisticated. Instead, this tool is uniquely dangerous in that it was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities. Its effectiveness at doing so can clearly be witnessed by the aforementioned lack of detection across vendors on VirusTotal.
This unique sample was packaged in a manner consistent with known APT29 techniques and their recent campaigns, which leveraged well-known cloud storage and online collaboration applications. Specifically, this sample was packaged as a self-contained ISO. Included in the ISO was a Windows shortcut (LNK) file, a malicious payload DLL and a legitimate copy of Microsoft OneDrive Updater. Attempts to execute the benign application from the ISO-mounted folder resulted in the loading of the malicious payload as a dependency through a technique known as DLL search order hijacking. However, while packaging techniques alone are not enough to definitively attribute this sample to APT29, these techniques demonstrate that users of the tool are now applying nation-state tradecraft to deploy BRc4.
Brute Ratel C4 made its initial debut as a penetration testing tool in December 2020. At the time, its development was a part-time effort by a security engineer named Chetan Nayak (aka Paranoid Ninja) living in India. According to his website (Dark Vortex), Nayak amassed several years of experience working in senior red team roles across western cybersecurity vendors. Over the past 2.5 years, Nayak introduced incremental improvements to the pentest tool in terms of features, capabilities, support and training.
Our analysis highlights the ongoing and relevant debate within the cybersecurity industry surrounding the ethics relating to the development and use of penetration testing tools that can be exploited for offensive purposes.
Over the past 2.5 years this tool has evolved from a part-time hobby to a full-time development project with a growing customer base. As this customer base has expanded into the hundreds, the tool has gained increased attention across the cybersecurity domain from both legitimate penetration testers as well as malicious cyber actors.
The analysis of the two samples described in this blog, as well as the advanced tradecraft used to package these payloads, make it clear that malicious cyber actors have begun to adopt this capability. We believe it is imperative that all security vendors create protections to detect BRc4 and that all organizations take proactive measures to defend against this tool.
Added command line parameter to allow the tool to run without applying optimizations. This is part of the -o parameter called none that then allows you to run things like the system cleanup tasks (NGEM DISM, etc.) without also having to optimize at the same time.
Diagnostic tools for Workspace ONE Tunnel client offers tools and script to identify and troubleshoot any client related issues on specific platforms. The first version included support for Windows desktop tunnel client and future version will include support for other platforms.
BothanSpy and Gyrfalcon are alleged CIA hacking tools targeting various SSH (Secure Shell) implementations with the objective of stealing usernames, passwords, SSH keys, and SSH key passphrases. They are tools used after access has already been gained to the target machine - typically a user's desktop/laptop - and are used for stealing credentials that can then be used to spread the attack further into servers and other systems.
Wikileaks has published documentation for each tool. The tools themselves were not available for review. However, the documentation is detailed enough that the method of operation of the tools can be easily inferred.
Each of the tools is intended for obtainining additional credentials (passwords, SSH keys) once the attacker has already penetrated a user's laptop or desktop using other methods. The obtained credentials will allow spreading the attack to further machines, particularly servers. It is well known that many organizations have very lax SSH key management practices and that compromise of even a single SSH key can in many cases lead to compromise of the entire server environment. This, of course, makes the tools very useful in preparing for destructive cyberwarfare as well as for gaining access for information exfiltration and disrupting the target's operations by inserting false information, evidence, or directives.
Once the DLL is injected, it extracts the following credentials for each connection: user name and password for password authenticated connections; user name, private key file name, and passphrase for public key authenticated connections. While the private key file itself is not fetched by this tool, it is reasonable to assume that other tools are readily available to fetch the file (and most likely fetch it automatically). The really useful collected information is the passphrase, which is used to encrypt the private key file. Obtaining the passphrase on top of the file itself enables the attacker to log in to any server where that key grants access. The passwords and passphrases are the real targets of this attack tool.
The BothanSpy tool has been designed to be used together with the ShellTerm attack framework. This framework appears to provide covert communications between the attacker's command and control server, as well as for example DLL injection capabilities in its newer versions (3.0+). When used with ShellTerm, the DLL communicates directly with its Fire and Collect channel, avoiding writing any information to disk. This makes detection harder, and no anti-malware software based on inspecting just written files will detect it.
In summary, BothanSpy appears to be a tool contracted to be built as a component of a larger framework around ShellTerm, but with the proviso that it can also be used independently. It does not break the SSH protocol or compromise its encryption. There are no zero-days involved. It instead compromises the SSH client process by injecting malicious code into it and reading the credentials from the memory of the SSH client process.
Gyrfalcon is designed to obtain credentials from OpenSSH running on various Linux distributions. Linux is the leading operating system used in the cloud and in public web servers. It seems likely that the attack tool could be easily adapted to run on any Unix variant.
The key components of Gyrfalcon are a server process and a DLL library that is loaded into the OpenSSH process. It uses an encrypted configuration file and encrypts collected data using AES. Apparently public key cryptography is used for encrypting the collected data such that only the operator can decrypt it. Additional tools are provided for creating encrypted configuration files and decrypting the output data.
Gyrfalcon appears to have been tested extensively on Linux distributions used in enterprises and the government. At least the Red Hat, CentOS, SuSE, Debian, and Ubuntu distributions are supported by the tool.
In summary, the attack tool is fairly unsurprising and unsophisticated. Its sophistication is more in the encryption of the configuration file and the results rather than the attack itself. The actual DLL implementation and credential interception in this manner could probably be implemented in a few hours to a few days. The software looks like a separately contracted tool built against a loose specification.
Interestingly, this version of Gyrfalcon does not appear to include integration with command-and-control systems. Also, it freely writes and changes files on disk. It performs several operations that could easily be detected as suspicious or anomalous by proper intrusion detection tools. It could have been implemented in a much more covert manner. Perhaps there was a lack of attention to such details because anti-malware software on Linux is still fairly uncommon. To some extent I find myself troubled by this lack of sophistication and lack of stealth. We have seen so much more sophisticated tools coming out from the intelligence community.
These attack tools appear real. My professional judgement is that they are likely to work and were likely commercially contracted as independent development projects. They do not rely on any classified techniques or zero-days and there is nothing surprising about them. Perhaps the biggest surprise is how easily detectable the techniques used by Gyrfalcon are; there really has not been much attention paid to being hard to detect.
Neither of these tools suggests any compromise of the SSH protocol. They do, however, illustrate the strong interest intelligence organizations and other attackers have towards SSH credentials, including SSH keys. They are a primary way for hackers to spread within the target organization. 2ff7e9595c
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